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INTRODUCTION: THE PPL AND
ENTERGY CASES
In September 2012, the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari in PPL Industries v. Comr.1 The case involves
the qualification of a so-called ‘‘windfall tax’’ im-
posed by the United Kingdom in 1997 and 1998 for
the foreign tax credit allowed by §901(a) of the
Code.2 The Tax Court held that the tax qualifies for
the credit,3 but the decision was reversed by the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit.4 In a companion
case, the Tax Court followed its PPL decision.5 In that
case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the decision of the Tax Court,6 creating a split
in the circuits. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to resolve the split. The case presents the first time the
Court will have addressed the question of the foreign
tax credit since its 1938 decision in Biddle v. Comr.7
The windfall tax (WFT) was imposed by the La-
bour government of Tony Blair, immediately after it
assumed office in 1997, following 18 years of Conser-
vative rule under Margaret Thatcher and John Major.
The Conservative government had undertaken a pro-
gram of selling to private parties businesses that had
been owned and operated by the government (‘‘priva-
tization’’), beginning with non-monopolies (in the pe-
riod prior to 1984) and subsequently monopolies such
as public utilities (after 1983). The privatized indus-
tries proved to be highly profitable in the early years
following privatization, leading to public outcry that
they had been sold by the government at prices that
were too low.
The WFT was designed as a charge that would, ef-
fectively and retroactively, increase the price charged
for the assets transferred to the private parties, to re-
duce or eliminate the bargain or windfall element of
the original price. The charge was determined by capi-
talizing the actual profits earned over the first four
years following privatization at a rate of 11.1%, to de-
termine the ‘‘profit-making value’’ of the enterprise —
i.e., essentially the fair market value or price that
‘‘should have been charged’’ for the company at the
time of flotation of the shares of the company. This
‘‘profit-making value’’ was reduced by the price actu-
ally charged (flotation value) to determine, essentially,
what was deemed the ‘‘bargain’’ element of the trans-
action. This bargain element was then subjected to a
23% tax.
If the WFT is characterized in this way — and ad-
mittedly there is an argumentative element in the
characterization — the idea of granting a foreign tax
credit for it is, by assumption, both anomalous and to
some extent offensive, and may even present constitu-
tional questions of the scope of congressional author-
ity. The grant of a credit essentially says to a U.S.-
owned entity that acquired operations in a ‘‘privatiza-
tion’’ transaction, at a windfall, that if a government
assumes power, subsequent to the government that au-
thorized the privatization transaction, and that govern-
ment retrospectively but lawfully increases the price
charged in the privatization transaction, the U.S. Trea-
sury will bear the cost of the increase, thus rendering
the U.S. Treasury a guarantor to the taxpayer of the
benefit of the earlier windfall accorded by the earlier
government. This implicates the U.S. Treasury in the
internal politics and fiscal affairs of a foreign govern-
ment, constitutes an arbitrary and uncompensated ser-
vice (the guarantee) provided by the Treasury to a pri-
vate party, and, to an extent, commits the U.S. gov-
ernment to the support of an economic policy
(privatization) that has not been approved through any
kind of democratic process in the United States.
The Tax Court decision rested upon a rejection of
the characterization of the windfall tax in the manner
described above. In the view of the Tax Court, and
also the Fifth Circuit, the taxpayers, and amici who
have appeared in the Supreme Court proceeding, the
WFT was nothing more than a retroactive excess prof-
its tax, imposed on the profits in the first four years.
The cornerstone of their argument was that with re-
spect to no affected taxpayer did the tax exceed the
profits with respect to which the tax was computed,
and thus the tax liability can be expressed as a per-
centage (less than 100%) of the profits involved,
which furthermore was, more or less, constant over
the numerable taxpayers subject to the tax. The tax-
payer, amici, and the decisions argue that the fact that
this tax rate is different from the nominal (statutory)
tax rate should not matter, so long as the ‘‘con-
structed’’ tax rate does not exceed 100%.
On this view, a credit for the tax is concededly less
offensive. It simply appears as an application of what
foreign tax credits ordinarily do, i.e., mitigate taxation
when two jurisdictions impose comparable taxes on
the same tax base. But even given this characteriza-
tion, the granting of the credit still has a troubling as-
1 133 S. Ct. 571 (2012).
2 All references to the Code are to the U.S. Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 unless otherwise indicated.
3 PPL Industries v. Comr., 135 T.C. 304 (2010), rev’d, 665 F.3d
60, cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 571 (2012).
4 PPL Industries v. Comr., 665 F.3d 60, cert. granted, 133 S. Ct.
571 (2012).
5 Entergy Corp. v. Comr., T.C. Memo 2010-197, rev’d, 683 F.3d
233 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 571 (2012).
6 Entergy Corp. v. Comr., 683 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2012), cert.
granted, 133 S. Ct. 571 (2012).
7 302 U.S. 573 (1938).
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pect. The windfall tax is widely viewed, in the United
Kingdom and in international circles, as a ‘‘partial’’ or
‘‘creeping’’ renationalization of the previously priva-
tized enterprises. International law and norms and the
constitutional norms of many countries, including
probably the U.S., require compensation when an in-
dustry is nationalized, partially or otherwise. It is a
pointed question why that compensation should be
paid by a home government of the investor whose in-
terests are ‘‘partially’’ nationalized, particularly when
the act of nationalization is one quite antagonistic to
the practices of the home government, which in this
case is the United States.
The Third Circuit rejected the view of the foreign
tax credit regulations implicit in the taxpayer’s posi-
tion and the decisions of the other courts. Under its
view, the governing regulations do not permit a tax-
payer to ‘‘reconstruct’’ the foreign rate to determine
whether the foreign tax liability falls only on profits
subject to U.S. tax. The determination should be made
strictly upon the manner in which the foreign state de-
fines its tax base: the question should be whether and
the extent to which the two countries define the base,
to determine whether both are imposing tax upon the
same amounts.
The objective in this article is to raise two difficul-
ties with the decisions of the lower courts that the aim
of the WFT was to reach net gain in normal circum-
stances, as required by existing U.S. regulations. Two
arguments of the Tax Court and Fifth Circuit are ad-
dressed. The first is that the windfall tax as con-
structed is the ‘‘equivalent’’ of a garden-variety excess
profits tax. This is done by the use of simple algebra,
set forth below.
The second is to address an argument, stressed by
the taxpayers’ briefs in the Supreme Court, that the
fact that the tax was imposed retroactively, and that its
incidence could be determined absolutely, militates in
favor of a finding that the tax was ‘‘likely to reach net
gain in the normal circumstances’’ to which it applies.
Rather, I argue below that, that circumstance weakens
the case for fitting the WFT into the regulatory defi-
nition of a tax ‘‘in the U.S. sense.’’ Dictionary defini-
tions of ‘‘likely’’ define the word as a synonym for
‘‘probable,’’ and dictionary definitions of ‘‘probable’’
define that term as excluding what is absolutely ‘‘cer-
tain.’’
THE U.K. PRIVATIZATION AND THE
WINDFALL TAX
Between 1979 and 1983, the Conservatives priva-
tized mostly companies that were not monopolies and
did not require specific economic regulation. Between
1984 and 1996 the U.K. government privatized more
than 50 government-owned companies, many of
which were monopolies.
The Tax Court says that ‘‘the U.K. Government
privatized those companies’’ — it is unclear whether
‘‘those’’ refers to all the companies, or only the 50
‘‘privatized’’ in 1984–96 — ‘‘largely’’ through ‘‘pub-
lic flotations (share offerings) at fixed price offers,
which involved the transfer of those government-
owned enterprises to new public limited companies
(plcs), followed by what was essentially a sale of all
or some of the shares in the new plcs to the public.’’8
The enterprises became publicly traded companies
listed on the London Stock Exchange, and the Tax
Court opinion says that in most cases, ‘‘the floated
shares opened for trading at a substantial premium
over the price the flotation investors paid for the
shares.’’9
Apparently, there were 32 U.K. government-owned
companies that were privatized and became liable for
the WFT; again, the Tax Court opinion is not clear
whether these include all private companies, but it
seems it is referring only to those that were regulated
after privatization. The PPL decision involved a Penn-
sylvania corporation, and South Western Electricity
plc (SWEB), which the Tax Court characterizes as an
‘‘indirect subsidiary’’ of the Pennsylvania corporation.
SWEB was one of 12 ‘‘regional electric companies’’
(RECs) privatized in 1990.
The opinion details that these utilities were regu-
lated in a manner that regulated prices, rather than
profits, and details the public perception that the prof-
its proved to be excessive under this regulatory re-
gime. It details that the Labour Party planned to capi-
talize on the unpopularity of the results of privatiza-
tion, and that in May 1996 the party’s ‘‘shadow
treasury’’ hired Arthur Andersen, described by the Tax
Court opinion as a ‘‘tax consulting firm,’’ to help de-
velop a proposal, which was finalized and presented
to the future Chancellor of the Exchequer in Novem-
ber 1996. Labour regained power in 1997, and the
WFT was adopted in July 1997.
The WFT had a rate of 23%. It was imposed on
companies ‘‘whose privatisation involved the imposi-
tion of economic regulation,’’ the 32 privatized after
1983.10 Its base was the excess of:
8 PPL Industries v. Comr., 135 T.C. 304, 306 (2010). By saying
that the ‘‘flotations . . . involved the transfer of those Government-
owned enterprises to new public limited companies,’’ it is not al-
together clear what the Tax Court means, and it may matter, if not
in terms of the doctrinal issues argued by the parties and consid-
ered by the courts, in terms of other rules which would appear to
be applicable, although they are not mentioned in the three deci-
sions. The term ‘‘enterprises’’ does not describe anything that, in
legal parlance, can be said to be, again in legal parlance, ‘‘trans-
ferred.’’ Presumably, the U.K. government ‘‘transferred’’ the as-
sets comprising the enterprise to the new public entity. What hap-
pened to certain intangible assets ordinarily critical to the opera-
tion of privately owned and operated quasi-monopolies in
advanced free enterprise economies, e.g., licenses, is not clear: the
creation of the plcs may have entailed the transfer of existing li-
censes or the creation of new ones for the newly created business
entities.
9 Id., at 304, 307.
10 Id., at 313, quoting Finance (No. 2) Act, 1997, ch. 58, part I,
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(a) the value in profit-making terms of the
disposal made on the occasion of the compa-
ny’s flotation [over]
(b) the value which for privatisation pur-
poses was put on that disposal.11
In other words, the excess of the fair market value
of the company at the time of privatization over the
price charged for the shares. The ‘‘value of a disposal
in profit-making terms of the disposal’’ on the ‘‘occa-
sion of flotation’’ was defined as the amount produced
by multiplying:
the average annual profit for the company’s
initial period by
the applicable price-to-earnings ratio.12
The initial period was the period encompassing the
company’s first four financial years after flotation or
the lesser period of existence for companies operating
for less than four financial years after privatization
and before April 1, 1997. The average annual profit
for the company was determined by dividing 365 by
the number of days in the period and multiplying by
the amount of the total profits for the company’s ini-
tial period. The total profits were the company’s after-
tax profits for financial reporting purposes as deter-
mined under relevant provisions of the U.K. Compa-
nies Act 1985, or its ‘‘ ‘profit on ordinary activities
after tax’ as determined under U.K. financial account-
ing principles and standards and as shown in the com-
pany’s profit and loss accounts prepared in accordance
with the U.K. Companies Act of 1985, as
amended.’’13
The applicable price-to-earnings ratio was nine.
DOING THE MATH: THE ALGEBRAIC
CONTROVERSY
An Example
To take an example, suppose the company had been
‘‘floated’’ at a price of 500x originally. Suppose the
company earned 75x for each of the first four years —
a profit rate of 15% annually. The windfall tax statute
would impute a ‘‘fair’’ price for the shares to be such
that the profit rate would be 11.1% — meaning the
price would be nine times the annual earnings, or
675x. The excess of this amount over the original is-
sue price (175x = 675x − 500x) would be the base of
the tax. The tax would be 23% of that amount, or
40.25x. I am here ignoring the ‘‘number of days’’ fea-
ture of the tax provisions, and computing amounts
solely on the basis of years; I shall continue to do this,
except at the limited points in the discussion where it
makes a difference to talk of days.
The stated objective of this scheme is to bring the
original investment up to a point where the ongoing
operations of the privatized businesses are not so
profitable. But it does this quite irregularly, because it
does not require a payment of the full amount of the
excess of the imputed value over the amount charged,
but rather requires only 23%. This makes a consider-
able difference, after the payment of the WFT, in both
the profit rate of the enterprise (retrospectively
viewed), and the percentage of the original share price
that the tax constitutes. For instance, if in our example
the profit rate were 12% (60x profit per year), the
WFT would be 9.2, raising the total investment to
509.2. This reduces the profit rate experienced in the
initial public offering to 11.78%, not a huge reduction,
and constitutes only 1.84% of the initial price. On our
example using a 15% profit rate, the corresponding
figures are 13.88% and 8.25%. The reduction in the
profit rate is about five times the reduction when the
profit rate was 12%; and the WFT as a percentage of
the original price is almost five times what it is when
the profit was 12%. If the profit rate is 20% (100x per
year) — a limiting case, for reasons to be addressed
presently — the WFT would be 92x, the after-WFT
profit rate would be 16.89%, and the WFT as a per-
centage of the initial investment would be 18.4%.
Thus, it is clear that the greater the profit rate (before
the WFT), the greater the percentage reduction in the
after-WFT profit rate, and the greater the WFT as a
percentage of the original investment. However, the
WFT, despite its outwardly equalizing objectives, still
left disparities in the after-WFT profit rate.
The Taxpayer’s Algebra
The taxpayers’ arguments in PPL and Entergy had
an algebraic underpinning. Begin with an algebraic
expression for the computation of the tax:
where T represents the tax liability; 23% is the tax
rate, P is the company’s aggregate initial-period profit,
D is the length of the initial period in days, and FV is
the company’s flotation value.
Let us take a moment and define what is in brack-
ets in equation (1) as the tax base (TB), that is, the
quantity identified by the statute that is multiplied by
the tax rate to get the tax:
Now in the ordinary case D is going to be 1,461,
i.e., four times 365 plus one day for a leap year. We
can ignore the one day, and safely treat 365/1,461 as
rounded to 1⁄4.
schedule 1, 1(1).
11 Id., at schedule 1, 1(2)(b).
12 Id., at schedule 1, 2(1) (emphases supplied).
13 Id., at 304, 313–14 & n. 8 (2011).
( ) . (T D
P
FV1 23 365 9# # #= -` j8 B
( ) (TB D
P
FV2 365 9# #= -` j
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So we can simplify equation (1) as follows:
and equation (2) as follows:
The taxpayer then resolves equation (3), treating 9⁄4
as 2.25, and assuming FV is zero. Because FV will al-
ways be greater than zero, and .23 × 2.25 equals
.5175, the taxpayer expresses the maximum amount
of windfall tax liability as follows:
(5) T ≤ .5175 P
Thus, the taxpayer argues that this looks like an ex-
cess profits tax, at a 51.75% rate, on the aggregate
four-year profits of the company. The offset attribut-
able to the flotation value is irrelevant; such an offset
is allowed by an ordinary excess profits tax in any
event, and the point is that the tax is computed with
reference to aggregate profit, which it does not confis-
cate in full.
There is a concession made, however, which can be
expressed mathematically by the following relation,
letting TR be a variable (statutory) tax rate:
In other words, if the tax rate is greater than
44.44%, the tax liability exceeds profits, the tax is
confiscatory, and, by hypothesis, the tax would not
qualify (in full) for a foreign tax credit. Neither the
taxpayers, amici, nor the Tax Court or Fifth Circuit
explain how it can be that a tax at 44% would be fully
creditable but one at 45% would be in full only de-
ductible. This would create what is called a ‘‘notch ef-
fect’’: the taxpayer’s liability would spike as the rate
crossed 44.44%.
Actual Profits: An Alternative Algebra
The contrary reading of the regulations, suggested
at the outset, may also be given an algebraic under-
pinning, although the Internal Revenue Service did
not do so in its argument, or even its Supreme Court
brief. Let us introduce another variable, which we will
call r, as the average annual profit rate during the
four-year testing period, i.e., the percentage which the
average profit earned (P/4) during the four years is of
the original flotation value (FV). We now focus on the
base of the windfall tax as actually constructed under
the U.K. law and not as reconstructed by the taxpay-
ers (i.e., by applying a coefficient in the tax base
(2.25) to the tax rate (23%) instead of leaving it as
part of the tax base). Getting rid of the ‘‘dailiness’’
computation, we wish to determine the threshold at
which the base of the windfall tax (as actually con-
structed under the U.K. law) is less than or equal to
the four-year profit. Let P be the four-year profit;
PMV, the profit-making value; FV, the flotation value;
and r the annual profit rate. Thus, the tax base as ac-
tually constructed under the U.K. law is PMV − FV,
and the equation we wish to solve is as follows:
(7) PMV − FV ≤ P
Representing that the aggregate profit for the four-
year period is four times the average annual profit:
(8) P = 4 × (r × FV)
and the ‘‘profit-making’’ value is nine times the av-
erage annual profit during the four-year period, or:
(9) PMV = 9 × (r × FV)
So, plugging equations (8) and (9) into equation
(7), we get:
(10) 9rFV − FV ≤ 4rFV
which resolves to:
(11) 5r ≤ 1
This means that r is less than or equal to 1⁄5, or
20%. Thus, if r is greater than 20%, the base of the
windfall tax (excess of ‘‘profit-making’’ value over
flotation value) will be greater than the aggregate
profits for the four-year period. This consideration
may be decisive of the entire case, notwithstanding
the welter of other considerations the controversy
properly implicates. In fact, the method of the tax —
capitalizing profits over a period of years at a fixed
rate, and deducting invested capital — will generate a
‘‘break-even’’ point with respect to any capitalization
rate, and any period over which profits were calcu-
lated. The break-even point will simply be the recip-
rocal (1 divided by the number) of the difference be-
tween the capitalization multiplier and the number of
years in the period. Thus, suppose you wanted the rate
of return to be 5% (a capitalization rate of 20), and
you used only one year in the period. The profit rate
at which you taxed an amount in excess of profits
would be 1⁄19, or 5.263%. In other words, if we sup-
pose the FV were 100, and the profits in the one year
were 10, then the tax base (100, i.e., 20 times 10 (200)
minus 100) would greatly exceed actual profits (10).
If the profits were 5.263, the tax base would be 20
times 5.263 (105.26) less 100, or 5.26, exactly equal
to profits for the year (or close enough for government
work).
One can express this mathematically, for any tax
structured along the lines of the windfall tax, where K
is the capitalization multiple, N is the number of years
in the period, R is the break-even profit rate, and, as
above, TB is the tax base and P the aggregate profit:
To repeat what this expression means: for any capi-
talization multiple, and any number of years in the
testing period, the tax base will exceed aggregate
profit in the testing period whenever for any affected
company the average annual profit rate exceeds the
number one divided by the excess of the capitalization
multiple over the number of years in the period. This
means that compliance with the ‘‘gross receipts’’ con-
dition of the regulations is a function of the magnitude
of the difference between the capitalization multiple
and the length of the period. If the difference is small,
( ) .T
P
FV3 23 4 9
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say one or two, then the profit rate at which a compa-
ny’s tax base will exceed aggregate profits is very
high. In such cases, a tax structured along the lines of
the WFT may well meet the criteria for being treated
as ‘‘likely’’ to reach net gain.
But as the difference gets larger, the ‘‘tipping’’
profit rate gets smaller, and the more frequent will be
the cases where the tax base will exceed aggregate
profits, sometimes by considerable amounts. With a
difference of five, as specified under the windfall tax,
and a ‘‘tipping point’’ at 20%, the tax would not ap-
pear to meet the gross receipts criterion.
If it will help, a table (Table 1) is attached showing,
for all capitalization rates from 1 to 10, and for all
testing periods from 1 to 10 years, the profit rate at
which corresponding to the pair of numbers chosen
above which the tax base, computed using the corre-
sponding capitalization rate and test period, will ex-
ceed aggregate profits for the period. This is Table 1.
A second table (Table 2) is attached, which shows
for all conceivable profit rates from 12 to 60, the ra-
tio of the tax base under the windfall tax (PMV − FV)
to aggregate profits for the four-year period. This table
shows, for instance, that if the average annual profits
during the four-year period were 25% of the flotation
value, the tax base of the windfall tax would be 25%
greater than the aggregate profits; at a 35% profit rate,
the excess is 53.57%; if the profit rate is as high as
50%, the base is a full 75% greater than aggregate
profits.
Table 2 also shows, for each profit rate, the effec-
tive tax rate, shown as a percentage of profits, which
the windfall tax would constitute. As the table shows,
on account of the offset for the profits attributable to
flotation value, that rate never even really approaches
51.75% — varying from just under 4% at a 12% profit
rate, to 42.17% even if profits averaged 60% of flota-
tion value over the four-year period. Note that all cal-
culations in Table 2 are in percentage terms and as-
sume a flotation value of 100; the resulting percent-
ages are independent of the amount of the flotation
value.
This calls greatly into question the Tax Court’s ar-
gument as to the ‘‘equivalence’’ of conceiving the
windfall tax as a tax on the flotation ‘‘undervalua-
tion,’’ or conceiving of it as a tax on ‘‘excess profits.’’
THE REGULATIONS
The governing regulations were finalized in 1983,
and have been uniformly recognized by courts apply-
ing them, including all three courts that decided the
PPL/Entergy cases, as having the ‘‘force of law.’’14
Section 901(a) allows a credit for foreign ‘‘income,
excess profits, and war profits taxes.’’ Case law pre-
dating the regulations held uniformly that the determi-
nation of whether a tax qualified as an income tax for
purposes of this statute was based on whether the tax
constituted an income tax by reference to the criteria
of U.S. law.15 The regulations define their mission as
determining ‘‘[w]hether a foreign levy is an income
tax.’’16 They provide that a levy is an income tax if
the levy meets two requirements:
• It is a tax; and
• Its ‘‘predominant character’’ is ‘‘that of an income
tax in the U.S. sense.’’
They provide that a levy is a tax if ‘‘it requires a
compulsory payment pursuant to the authority of a
foreign country to levy taxes.’’17 As to the second cri-
terion, the regulations provide that ‘‘[t]he predomi-
nant character of a foreign tax is that of an income tax
in the U.S. sense’’ if two conditions are met:
[T]he foreign tax is likely to reach net gain
in the normal circumstances in which it ap-
plies [and]
[O]nly to the extent that liability for the tax
is not dependent, within the meaning of
paragraph (c) of this section, by its terms or
otherwise, on the availability of a credit for
the tax against income tax liability to another
country.18
The regulations then provide that a foreign tax is
‘‘likely to reach net gain in the normal circumstances
in which it applies if and only if the tax, judged on
the basis of its predominant character, satisfies each of
the realization, gross receipts, and net income require-
ments’’ detailed, at great length that will not be re-
peated here, in the regulations.19 The requirement
placed at issue by the decisions in the windfall tax
matter is the following:
(3) Gross receipts. — (i) In general. A for-
eign tax satisfies the gross receipts require-
ment if, judged on the basis of its predomi-
nant character, it is imposed on the basis of
—
(A) Gross receipts; or
(B) Gross receipts computed under a method
that is likely to produce an amount that is
not greater than fair market value.
14 PPL Industries, Inc. v. Comr., 665 F.3d 60, 63 (3d Cir. 2011),
cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 571 (2012), citing Texasgulf, Inc. v.
Comr., 172 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 1999); Amoco Corp. v. Comr., 138
F.3d 1139, T.C. Memo 1996-159 (7th Cir. 1998).
15 Biddle v. Comr., 302 U.S. 573, 578, 581–82 (1938); Keasbey
& Mattison Co. v. Rothensies, 133 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1943); New
York & Honduras Rosario Min. Co. v. Comr., 168 F.2d 745 (2d
Cir. 1948); Comr. v. American Metal Co., 221 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.
1955); Lanman & Kemp-Barclay & Co. v. Comr., 26 T.C. 582
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A foreign tax that, judged on the basis of its
predominant character, is imposed on the
basis of amounts described in this paragraph
(b)(3)(i) satisfies the gross receipts require-
ment even if it is also imposed on the basis
of some amounts not described in this para-
graph (b)(3)(i).20
An example in the regulations recites that a petro-
leum tax deems gross receipts to be 105% of the fair
market value of petroleum extracted. It says that the
‘‘computation is designed to produce an amount that
is greater than the fair market value of actual gross re-
ceipts,’’ and that ‘‘therefore, the tax on extraction in-
come is not likely to produce an amount that is not
greater than fair market value.’’
THE TAX COURT AND COURT OF
APPEALS DECISIONS
In its decision, the Tax Court stressed, as an initial
matter, the importance to its decision of the fact that,
for each company subject to the windfall tax, its
windfall tax liability appeared to have been less than
its aggregate profits in the four-year test period:
[H]owever we describe the form of the
windfall tax base, our inquiry as to the de-
sign and incidence of the tax convinces us
that its predominant character is that of a tax
on excess profits. As an initial matter, we
note that the parties have stipulated that
none of the 31 companies that paid windfall
tax had a windfall tax liability in excess of
its total profits over its initial period.21
The court, with respect to design, said of the IRS
position:
With respect to design, respondent reorders
the usual notion (at least in architecture) that
form follows function to argue, in essence,
that form determines function; i.e., that the
design of the tax base (the excess of one
value over another) demonstrates Parlia-
ment’s decision to enact a tax based on value
(i.e., ‘‘to tax undervaluation on flotation of
the Windfall Tax Companies’’) ‘‘rather than
a tax based on income or excess profits.’’22
The court rejected that position on grounds that the
stated reasons for the tax — to adjust the flotation
price so that it was fair, and to drive down the ‘‘ex-
cessive’’ profits enjoyed by the companies — were es-
sentially equivalent, and that Parliament understood
this to be so:
[P]rofits were considered excessive in rela-
tion to the prices at which the windfall tax
companies were sold to the public, which, in
turn, were deemed to be too low. One expla-
nation implies the other. It follows, then, that
both parties may be said to be correct in
their assessment of the political motivation
for the windfall tax.
* * * *
The architects and drafters of the tax knew
(1) exactly which companies the tax would
target, (2) the publicly reported after-tax fi-
nancial profits of those companies, which
were a crucial component of the tax base,
and (3) the target amount of revenue the tax
would raise. Therefore, it cannot have been
an unintentional or fortuitous result that, (1)
for 29 of the 31 windfall tax companies that
paid tax, the effective rate of tax on deemed
annual excess profits was at or near 51.7
percent, and (2) for none of the 31 compa-
nies did the tax exceed total initial period
profits. What respondent refers to as ‘‘peti-
tioner’s algebraic reformulations of the
Windfall Tax statute’’ do not, as respondent
argues, constitute an impermissible ‘‘hypo-
thetical rewrite of the Windfall Tax statute’’.
Rather they represent a legitimate means of
demonstrating that Parliament did, in fact,
enact a tax that operated as an excess profits
tax for the vast majority of the windfall tax
companies. The design of the windfall tax
formula made certain that the tax would, in
fact, operate as an excess profits tax for the
vast majority of the companies subject to
it.23
But in contrast to the Tax Court, the Third Circuit
found the taxpayer’s reformulation of the tax as ‘‘a
bridge too far.’’ Referring to the argument flowing
from what are set forth above as equations (4) and (5),
the Third Circuit said:
[T]he income portion of this tax base—2.25
times gross receipts—violates the gross re-
ceipts requirement, which limits the basis of
a tax to gross receipts or an approximation
thereof ‘‘likely to produce an amount that is20 Regs. §1.901-2(b)(3).
21 PPL Industries, Inc. v. Comr., 135 T.C. 304, 338 (2010),
rev’d, 665 F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 571
(2012).
22 135 T.C. at 304, 333–34 (2010).
23 135 T.C. at 304, 339–41 (emphasis added) (footnotes omit-
ted).
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not greater than [their] fair market value.’’
Treas. Reg. §1.901-2(b)(3)(i)(B) (emphasis
added).24
In other words, the Third Circuit appears to have
been saying that the alleged equivalence was a func-
tion not of the ‘‘character’’ of the tax, but of the par-
ticularities of the rate involved:
However, changing the tax rate in this way
to avoid a problem with the tax base would
read the gross receipts requirement out of the
regulation. This we decline to do. An ex-
ample from the Treasury regulation illus-
trates why our law does not tolerate such a
mathematical maneuver. In the example, an-
other country imposes a tax on the extraction
of petroleum. Treas. Reg. §1.901-2(b)(3)(ii),
Ex. 3. The country deems ‘‘gross receipts’’
to equal 105% of the market value of the
petroleum extracted. That is, the starting
point for the tax base is 105% of each af-
fected company’s gross receipts from petro-
leum. The regulation disallows a credit for
the tax because it ‘‘is designed to produce an
amount that is greater than the fair market
value of actual gross receipts.’’ Id. As the tax
would not even be creditable up to the
amount imposed on 100% of gross receipts,
less associated costs, the entirety of the tax
fails to satisfy the requirement. This all-or-
nothing result is so because the regulation
mandates that ‘‘a tax either is or is not an
income tax, in its entirety, for all persons
subject to the tax.’’ Id. §1.901-2(a)(1)(ii)
(emphasis added). If 105% of gross receipts
(barely more than actual receipts) does not
satisfy the requirement, then 225% is in the
same boat but another ocean.25
In affirming the Tax Court, the Fifth Circuit, with
apparent care, eschewed the language of the Tax
Court about looking to extrinsic circumstances, or of
language of form versus substance. Instead, it hewed
close to the regulation and the three-factor test. It
quoted at length the Tax Court’s language concerning
the asserted equivalence of the tax as nominally com-
puted and a tax on actual profits. It characterized the
IRS’s ‘‘insistence on the primacy of the Windfall
Tax’s text’’ as an ‘‘argument . . . easy to dispatch,’’ be-
cause ‘‘[t]he case law from which 26 C.F.R. §1.901-2
is derived refutes the Commissioner’s assertion that
we should rely exclusively, or even chiefly, on the text
of the Windfall Tax in determining the tax’s ‘predomi-
nant character.’ ’’26 The court said the net income and
realization requirements were clearly satisfied, but
then acknowledged some greater difficulty with the
gross receipts requirement:
The Commissioner’s formalistic argument
applies with somewhat greater force to the
gross receipts requirement. A tax actually
directed at corporate value would not, in the
ordinary instance, be imposed on the basis of
gross receipts. The Commissioner essentially
urges that because Parliament computed the
Windfall Tax based on ‘‘profit-making
value,’’ calculated according to average prof-
its over an initial period, the tax is not de-
signed to reach gross receipts, even though
the tax may be based on gross receipts in
some indirect way. But we are persuaded by
the Tax Court’s astute observations as to the
Windfall Tax’s predominant character: the
tax’s history and practical operation were to
‘‘claw back’’ a substantial portion of priva-
tized utilities’ ‘‘excess profits’’ in light of
their sale value. These initial profits were the
difference between the utilities’ income from
all sources less their business expenses — in
other words, gross receipts less expenses
from those receipts, or net income. The tax
rose in direct proportion to additional profits
above a fixed (and carefully calculated) floor.
That Parliament termed this aggregated but
entirely profit-driven figure a ‘‘profit-making
value’’ must not obscure the history and ac-
tual effect of the tax, that is, its predominant
character.27
Judge Jones then addressed the Third Circuit’s
opinion in PPL. She characterized the opinion as hav-
ing ‘‘accepted that perhaps the Windfall Tax reached
23% of 2.25 times the companies’ initial period prof-
its,’’ but as having ‘‘viewed this as fatal to the gross
receipts requirement,’’ because ‘‘a tax must be estab-
lished on the basis of no more than 100% of gross re-
ceipts.’’ The Fifth Circuit responded:
This reasoning exemplifies the form-over-
substance methodology that the governing
regulation and case law eschew. The gross
receipts requirement ensures a creditable
income tax is usually computed ‘‘begin[ning]
from actual gross receipts, rather than no-
tional amounts.’’ BITTKER & LOKKEN at
¶ 72.1. This distinction between ‘‘actual re-
24 PPL Industries, Inc. v. Comr., 665 F.3d 60, 64 n. 1 (3d Cir.
2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 571 (2012).
25 Id.
26 Entergy Corp. v. Comr., 683 F.3d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 2012).
27 Id., at 233, 236–37.
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ceipts’’ and ‘‘notional amounts’’ reflects a
core requirement in Section 1.901-2 that
creditable foreign taxes must be based on
either actual income or an imputed value not
intended to reach more than actual gross re-
ceipts.
The court held that the 2.25x computation was an
acceptable ‘‘imputed value’’ because it was not likely
to reach profits not actually earned by the companies:
Nevertheless, not all methods of imputing
income fail to satisfy the gross receipts re-
quirement. Section 1.901-2(b)(3)(i) indicates
that a foreign tax satisfies the gross receipts
requirement if it is imposed either on actual
gross receipts or imputed gross receipts
‘‘computed under a method that is likely to
produce an amount that is not greater than
fair market value.’’ Either of these reflects
‘‘actual gross receipts.’’ Treas. Reg. §1.901-
2(b)(3)(i)(A), (B).28
It relied upon the fact that the tax was imposed only
on known profits of the companies:
In fact, as the record indicates, each utility
could only be subject to the Windfall Tax
after making a profit exceeding approxi-
mately an 11% annual return on its initial
flotation value, and the Windfall Tax liability
increased linearly with additional profits past
that point. Moreover, the Third Circuit opin-
ion seems to overlook that a tax based on
actual financial profits in the U.K. sense nec-
essarily begins with gross receipts, as, again,
the record here indicates. London Electrici-
ty’s profit for purpose of the Windfall Tax
was calculated by computing gross receipts
less operating expenses. The Windfall Tax
was designed to reach a subset of this left-
over amount by beginning with an amount
predicated on actual gross receipts minus
flotation value.29
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the 2.25 multiplier
‘‘had nothing to do with inflating the utilities’ profits
into notional amounts’’:
The 2.25 multiplier resulted from dividing
the number of days in a year by approxi-
mately the number of days in four years —
or, simplified, one-quarter. This number was
multiplied by nine — the price-to-earnings
ratio — to result in 2.25 (times profits). By
the Third Circuit’s logic, had the Windfall
Tax applied to the first nine years after flota-
tion, rendering the initial period approxi-
mately 3,285 days (and the divisor one-
ninth), the ‘‘multiplier’’ would have been
(approximately) 1, and the Windfall Tax
would suddenly qualify for dollar-for-dollar
credit under Internal Revenue Code §901.
But the Third Circuit illogically holds that a
Windfall Tax for eight years, or four, as in
this case, is in entirely ‘‘another ocean’’ and
may not be credited.30
GROSS RECEIPTS AND NET GAIN
The algebraic derivation above raises serious ques-
tions about the Fifth Circuit’s response to the Third
Circuit’s view of the ‘‘gross receipts’’ requirement
(and the ultimate ‘‘net gain’’ conclusion). That deriva-
tion shows that, with a capitalization rate of nine, and
a testing period of four years, if a company earned
profits during the test period at an annual average rate
in excess of 20%, the tax base as defined by the for-
eign statute would have exceeded actual profits. This
would mean it was based on something other than
‘‘gross receipts.’’ At a rate in excess of 20% but not
more than 21%, the excess would have been more
than 5% of the ‘‘actual’’ gross receipts. The tax base
would be larger because the United Kingdom was
seeking to capture value attributable not only to the
four years, but to the indefinite future.31
Beyond that, however, the Tax Court’s emphasis on
the comparison between the tax payment and aggre-
gate profits addresses a question that the regulations
simply do not ask. The question, under the ‘‘net gain’’
concept, is not whether the tax payment is in excess
of the net profits. The question is whether the tax base
is less than or equal to net profits. And the Tax Court
makes no reference to any stipulation that in all or
most cases the base to which the 23% rate was ap-
plied was less than the net profits of the company for
the four-year period.
It is a mystery why this question was not asked, and
why there are no findings on this question. All of the
data necessary to make the computations, presumably
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id., at 233, 236, 238–39.
31 If it be objected that the gross receipts (or net gain) in years
beyond were the basis of the tax, the objection does not help be-
cause to that extent the windfall tax would not meet the realiza-
tion requirement of the regulations, which requires that the tax be
imposed ‘‘[u]pon or subsequent to the occurrence of events . . .
that would result in the realization of income under the income tax
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.’’ Regs. §1.901-
2(b)(2)(i)(A).
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for all 32 companies, was publicly available. All that
was necessary were numbers for the aggregate profits
for the four years, plus the flotation values. From the
profits, one could compute ‘‘profit-making value’’;
subtract the flotation value; and compare the resulting
number to the aggregate profits. Apparently no one
did this for any of the companies, even PPL and En-
tergy, the two companies claiming the credit.
The question is whether this lacuna in the record
matters. The simple math demonstrates that the prof-
its would equal or exceed the tax base only in the case
of companies with an average ‘‘profit rate’’ of 20% or
less per year. If the average profit rate were above
that level, the tax base would be greater than the prof-
its for the four-year period. Moreover, the simple
math demonstrates that for any tax so designed, with
a specified capitalization rate and using a specified
testing period, one can identify an annual average
profit rate, expressed as a percentage of the initial flo-
tation price, above which the tax base as defined by
the foreign statute would exceed the aggregate profits
in the testing period.
This fact — simply demonstrable with elementary
algebra — demolishes the Tax Court’s finding of the
‘‘equivalence’’ of the windfall tax capital-type tax and
an excess profits tax, or Judge Jones’s characterization
of the windfall tax base as ‘‘entirely profit-driven.’’
The simple truth is: the two tax bases are different; the
conclusion that the windfall tax tax base consists
solely of profit is wholly dependent upon an exog-
enous circumstance; and that circumstance probably
did not obtain in many circumstances. Even without
findings or an examination of the data, it is difficult to
believe — given the apparent public outcry against
the excessive profits of the privatized companies, and
given that the Labour Party had the confidence to im-
pose this controversial tax — that all of the compa-
nies involved had profit rates between 11% and 20%.
And, in any event, the burden was on the taxpayer to
demonstrate the failure of the proposed assessments.
If the taxpayer could not show that the profits of the
companies involved for the period in the preponder-
ance of cases exceeded the tax base defined by the
United Kingdom statute, the taxpayer did not meet its
burden.
Even in the unlikely circumstance that all or most
of them did, it is not clear that would be enough to
save the windfall tax as a creditable tax. Depending
on how one interprets the regulation, it may be that
the mere possibility that the base would exceed net
profits is sufficient to destroy its qualification as
‘‘likely to reach net gain.’’ Just as surely, however, the
actual values of the two factors that determine the
break-even profit rate (the capitalization rate and the
period used to measure profits) matter. Judge Jones’s
purported reductio ad absurdum of the Third Circuit’s
gross receipts argument is relevant here. Judge Jones
is correct that, as the length of the period of measure-
ment increases, the likelihood that the tax will hit only
net profits increases. In her example, if the test period
were eight years, with a capitalization rate of 9, prof-
its would have to be 100% of flotation value for the
tax base to exceed them.32 At that level, one might
conclude that a profit rate at that level sustained over
that period of time was so improbable that the possi-
bility the tax base would be based on notional gross
receipts was negligible. But that conclusion cannot be
made with a break-even profit rate of 20%, and a test-
ing period of four years.
Just to give an example, assume an average profit
rate over the four years of 25%, and a flotation value
of 500, so that annual profits are 125, and aggregate
profits 500. The profit-making value is nine times 125,
or 1,125. Reduced by the 500 flotation value, the 23%
rate applies to a base of 625. This is in excess of the
net profits for the period (500). The tax is based on
‘‘notional’’ gross receipts of the kind proscribed by
the regulations and the examples in them.
The Tax Court and Fifth Circuit, as well as the tax-
payers in their brief and amici in their filings in the
Supreme Court, deride the IRS position as elevating
the ‘‘form’’ of the windfall tax statute over the wind-
fall tax’s economic ‘‘substance.’’ The algebra above
makes vividly clear what was the ‘‘substance’’ of the
windfall tax. Its predominant character is not that of
an income tax.
DOING THE ENGLISH: ‘LIKELY’ AND
‘CERTAIN’
Part of the offensive and somewhat dangerous as-
pect of the claim that the windfall tax qualifies for a
foreign tax credit is the totally retroactive nature of
the U.K. enactment, combined with the fact that it
was ‘‘one off,’’ that is, imposed one time, once and for
all. This seems to invite foreign governments to im-
pose retroactive enactments on accumulated profits of
foreign or foreign-owned (i.e., U.S. or U.S.-owned)
companies, framing the enactments as a percentage of
profits, and thereby render the companies, in Judge
Jones’s words in Entergy, ‘‘a conduit from the tax-
accrediting nation (e.g., the United States) to the na-
tion imposing the tax,’’33 i.e., engaging in a partial or
creeping nationalization, with compensation borne by
the U.S. tax-paying public.
The government’s brief in the Supreme Court does
not stress such considerations, but a brief filed by a
group of tax law professors, quite distinguished inter-
national tax law professors, stresses both — identify-
ing the ‘‘perverse incentives’’ a ruling for the taxpayer
would give foreign governments, and emphasizing the
one-off and ‘‘purely’’ retroactive nature of the tax to
32 Using 500 as the flotation value, as in our example above, if
profits were 100% (500) for eight years, aggregate profits would
be 4,000, and the ‘‘profit-making value’’ would be 4,500 (9 ×
500). The tax base, the excess of profit-making value over flota-
tion value would be 4,000, exactly equal to aggregate profits. If
profits were 101% (505) for eight years, the tax base would be
4,045, greater than the aggregate profits (4,040), and thus the tax
would apply to ‘‘notional’’ gross receipts or ‘‘notional’’ profits.
33 Entergy Corp. v. Comr., 683 F.3d 233, 237 (5th Cir. 2012),
cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 571.
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argue that the tax is, in the regulations’ intended
sense, un-American.34 The brief responds to this with
two arguments. First, it argues that the WFT is fa-
cially a tax on ‘‘value’’ (by which the professors re-
ally mean ‘‘capital’’), and that if reconstructed as the
petitioners would do, any tax on value, or indeed
many if not most consumption taxes, could be recast
as taxes on income or profits. Second, they argue that
the retroactivity and non-periodic features of this tax
render it, under the regulations, a tax whose predomi-
nant character is not that of an income tax in the
United States sense.
These are treacherous arguments. The first is dan-
gerous because, while the observation involved is al-
together valid, it may not be something the existing
regulations preclude, and indeed, as the professors’
brief recognizes with respect to ‘‘at least’’ some of the
amici on the other side,35 it may be viewed by many
as a desirable aspect of the existing regulations, from
either a legal or policy standpoint, including possibly
some of the current Justices.
The second is much more faulty, because, although
the professors manfully essay to impute to the regula-
tions requirements that a foreign tax be periodic and
nonretroactive, suggesting the point is ‘‘so clear that
it was not essential for Treasury to restate it explicitly
in the regulations,’’36 their argument in truth requires
invalidating the regulations in part. The regulations
say a tax has the requisite ‘‘predominant character’’ if
and only if the three factors cited in the regulations
obtain. The ‘‘if’’ part is an objectionable feature of the
regulations: prior case law supported the ‘‘only if’’
portion, because various decisions held that absent
one of the three factors, the tax failed. All three were
thus necessary, but no authority prior to the regula-
tions said that collectively they were suffıcient. The
regulations do say this, clear as a bell, that was sort of
the whole point of their originality when they were
promulgated. You cannot put in additional conditions
without violating the regulations, even apparently fun-
damental features of the United States income tax,
like nonretroactivity or the annual accounting man-
dated by the Supreme Court’s ancient decisions in
Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.37 or North American
Oil Consolidated v. Burnet.38
For this reason, one objective here is to search for
a legal theory that will in effect treat any such enact-
ment as noncreditable. The most straightforward such
rule would be to say that the combination of a one-off
tax, ‘‘pure’’ retroactivity, and resort to non-tax finan-
cial accounts are sufficient in themselves to render
such a tax not an income tax under the statute. At first
glance, the regulations appear to stand in the way of
such a straightforward rule. The question here is
whether a prophylactic rule of this kind can be articu-
lated under the regulations as written. It can be. It re-
volves around the meaning of the word ‘‘likely.’’
The PPL brief for the petitioner in the Supreme
Court trumpets the pure retroactivity of the windfall
tax as a virtue, helping qualify it for the foreign tax
credit, because it was not only ‘‘likely’’ to reach net
gain, but ‘‘certain’’ to. This is the heading of one of
its arguments: ‘‘The Windfall Tax Is Not Only Likely
But Certain to Reach Net Gain in the Normal Circum-
stances in Which It Applies.’’39 The brief repeats the
expression numerous times. To like effect is the Tax
Court:
What respondent refers to as ‘‘petitioner’s
algebraic reformulations of the Windfall Tax
statute’’ do not, as respondent argues, consti-
tute an impermissible ‘‘hypothetical rewrite
of the Windfall Tax statute.’’ Rather they
represent a legitimate means of demonstrat-
ing that Parliament did, in fact, enact a tax
that operated as an excess profits tax for the
vast majority of the windfall tax companies.34 Brief of Anne Alstott, Marvin Chirelestein, Mihir Desai, Mi-
chael Graetz, Daniel Halperin, Mitchell Kane, Lawrence Lokken,
Robert Peroni, and Alvin Warren, PPL Corporation v. Comr., re-
produced at 2013 TNT 19–23.
35
Like wealth taxes, non-creditable taxes on consump-
tion are also closely related to taxes on income. Since
consumption and income are often correlated, accept-
ing mathematical reformulations of the sort used by
petitioner here might also potentially extend the for-
eign tax credit to a variety of consumption taxes. This
is, of course, exactly what at least some amici for peti-
tioner intend. Brief for Amici Curiae Roseanne Alt-
shuler, et.al. at 19–20, citing McLure, Jr. and Zodrow,
‘‘The Economic Case for Foreign Tax Credits for Cash
Flow Taxes,’’ 51 Nat. Tax J. 1 (1998). See also War-
ren, ‘‘How Much Capital Income Taxed Under an In-
come Tax Is Exempt Under a Cash-Flow Tax?’’ 52 Tax
L. Rev. 1 (1996).
Id.
36 Id.
37 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
38 286 U.S. 417 (1932). The Brief argues:
Surely the requirement of ‘net gain’ in the ‘normal
circumstances of its operations in which it applies’
under 26 C.F.R. section 1.901-2(a)(3)(i) of the regula-
tions implies the crucial income tax role of an annual
accounting period; otherwise, it would not be describ-
ing a tax ‘with the predominant character of an income
tax.’ This point is so clear that it was not essential for
Treasury to restate it explicitly in the regulations.
Brief of Anne Alstott, Marvin Chirelestein, Mihir Desai, Mi-
chael Graetz, Daniel Halperin, Mitchell Kane, Lawrence Lokken,
Robert Peroni, and Alvin Warren, PPL Corporation v. Comr., re-
produced at 2013 TNT 19–23.
39 The brief for petitioner is reproduced at 2012 TNT 242-17
(12/17/12).
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The design of the windfall tax formula made
certain that the tax would, in fact, operate as
an excess profits tax for the vast majority of
the companies subject to it.40
The Fifth Circuit quotes this language and charac-
terizes it as ‘‘astute.’’41
The implication is that if something is ‘‘certain,’’ it
is a fortiori and perforce ‘‘likely’’; what is certain
must be likely, it follows as the night the day.
To which one might respond: Not so fast, Lopez.
Guess again. Suppose you had inside information that
a takeover of Lameco was going to be announced the
following morning, and that a letter of intent had been
signed that afternoon, and after the signing of the let-
ter of intent, you bought the stock, and you were sub-
sequently asked why you bought the stock, and you
said, ‘‘I thought it was likely that a takeover was go-
ing to be announced.’’ You would be lying, right? You
didn’t ‘‘think’’ a takeover announcement was
‘‘likely.’’ You knew a takeover announcement was
certain. ‘‘Likely’’ and ‘‘certain’’ mean two different
things. Right? If someone else said this, and s/he was
under oath at the time, and you were a prosecutor, and
you knew the underlying facts, you would have a ba-
sis for a perjury charge against him/her, wouldn’t
you?
Wiktionary gives a number of definitions for
‘‘likely,’’ but only the first one is germane here, and
that simply defines the word as ‘‘probable; having a
greater-than-even chance of occurring.’’42 Webster’s
gives the first definition of ‘‘likely’’ as ‘‘of such a na-
ture or so circumstanced as to make something more
probable.’’43 This leads to the question what does
‘‘probable’’ mean. Webster’s gives the first definition
(definition 1a) of ‘‘probable’’ as ‘‘that is based on or
arises from adequate or convincing though not abso-
lutely conclusive intrinsic or extrinsic evidence or
support.’’ Definition 1b is ‘‘that can reasonably and
fairly convincingly be accepted as true, factual or pos-
sible without being undeniably so.’’ Definition 1c is
‘‘that reasonably and fairly convincingly establishes
something as true, factual, or possible but not with ab-
solute conclusiveness.’’ So. ‘‘Likely’’ means ‘‘prob-
able,’’ and ‘‘probable’’ means the chances are x, where
(I feel an altogether superfluous equation coming on):
(13) .50 < x < 1.00
So ‘‘likely’’ means ‘‘probable,’’ they are virtual
synonyms, and the domain of what is probable does
not include what is certain. ‘‘Certain’’ and ‘‘likely’’
mean different things; ‘‘likely’’ is not inclusive, but
rather exclusive, of ‘‘certain.’’ You can rev up that
perjury prosecution, counselor.
A slight wrinkle in this argument is that the abso-
lute ‘‘if and only if’’ provision of the regulations
seems to set forth an exhaustive definition of when an
income tax is ‘‘likely to reach net gain.’’ But a better
reading of the definition, and use of the term ‘‘likely,’’
which is reinforced by the reference to the ‘‘normal
circumstances’’ in which the tested tax ‘‘applies,’’ ex-
cludes an absolutely determined, completely retroac-
tive, one-time-only imposition from the category of
taxes whose ‘‘predominant character is that of an in-
come tax in the United States sense.’’





2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 100.0% 50.0% 33.3% 25.0% 20.0% 16.7% 14.3% 12.5% 11.1% 10.0% 9.1%
2 100.0% 50.0% 33.3% 25.0% 20.0% 16.7% 14.3% 12.5% 11.1% 10.0%
3 100.0% 50.0% 33.3% 25.0% 20.0% 16.7% 14.3% 12.5% 11.1%
4 100.0% 50.0% 33.3% 25.0% 20.0% 16.7% 14.3% 12.5%
5 100.0% 50.0% 33.3% 25.0% 20.0% 16.7% 14.3%
6 100.0% 50.0% 33.3% 25.0% 20.0% 16.7%
7 100.0% 50.0% 33.3% 25.0% 20.0%
8 100.0% 50.0% 33.3% 25.0%




40 PPL Industries v. Comr., 135 T.C. 304, 340–41 (2010), rev’d,
665 F.3d 60, cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 571 (footnotes omitted).
41 Entergy Corp. v. Comr., 683 F.3d 233, 236–37 (5th Cir.
2012), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 571.
42 http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/likely (last visited Jan. 16,
2013).
43 Webster’s Third International Dictionary (1993) (emphasis
supplied).
ARTICLES
Tax Management International Journal
144  2013 Tax Management Inc., a subsidiary of The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.
ISSN 0090-4600
Table 2. Ratio of Tax Base to Profits as a Function
of Profit Rate (Assuming FV = 100)
Profit Rate Profits (Four-Year) Tax Base Ratio of Tax Baseto Profits
Tax as Percentage
of Profits
12 48 8 16.67% 3.83%
13 52 17 32.69% 7.52%
14 56 26 46.43% 10.68%
15 60 35 58.33% 13.42%
16 64 44 68.75% 15.81%
17 68 53 77.94% 17.93%
18 72 62 86.11% 19.81%
19 76 71 93.42% 21.49%
20 80 80 100.00% 23.00%
21 84 89 105.95% 24.37%
22 88 98 111.36% 25.61%
23 92 107 116.30% 26.75%
24 96 116 120.83% 27.79%
25 100 125 125.00% 28.75%
26 104 134 128.85% 29.63%
27 108 143 132.41% 30.45%
28 112 152 135.71% 31.21%
29 116 161 138.79% 31.92%
30 120 170 141.67% 32.58%
31 124 179 144.35% 33.20%
32 128 188 146.88% 33.78%
33 132 197 149.24% 34.33%
34 136 206 151.47% 34.84%
35 140 215 153.57% 35.32%
36 144 224 155.56% 35.78%
37 148 233 157.43% 36.21%
38 152 242 159.21% 36.62%
39 156 251 160.90% 37.01%
40 160 260 162.50% 37.38%
41 164 269 164.02% 37.73%
42 168 278 165.48% 38.06%
43 172 287 166.86% 38.38%
44 176 296 168.18% 38.68%
45 180 305 169.44% 38.97%
46 184 314 170.65% 39.25%
47 188 323 171.81% 39.52%
48 192 332 172.92% 39.77%
49 196 341 173.98% 40.02%
50 200 350 175.00% 40.25%
51 204 359 175.98% 40.48%
52 208 368 176.92% 40.69%
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Table 2. Ratio of Tax Base to Profits as a Function
of Profit Rate (Assuming FV = 100)
Profit Rate Profits (Four-Year) Tax Base Ratio of Tax Baseto Profits
Tax as Percentage
of Profits
53 212 377 177.83% 40.90%
54 216 386 178.70% 41.10%
55 220 395 179.55% 41.30%
56 224 404 180.36% 41.48%
57 228 413 181.14% 41.66%
58 232 422 181.90% 41.84%
59 236 431 182.63% 42.00%
60 240 440 183.33% 42.17%
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